Democracy Threat Index
Categorical questions
| Question | Probability | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Will no debates be held between the actual or presumptive presidential nominees of the two major parties in the following US elections? (2027-2028) | 14.2% | - I predict an 86% chance that at least one presidential debate will be held, and a 14% chance of no debates. This 14% risk is elevated compared to historical precedent. - Every US presidential election since 1976 has had at least one head-to-head debate between the major party nominees. This includes the 2024 election, where two debates were held by news networks after candidates bypassed the Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD). - The risk of no debates is heightened because the Republican National Committee voted in 2022 to prohibit its nominees from participating in CPD-sponsored debates. Candidates may also strategically avoid debates, a tactic used by Donald Trump when he skipped all five Republican primary debates in 2024. - Strong incentives for debates to occur remain. News networks seek the high ratings associated with debates, and candidates trailing in polls have a strong motive to push for a debate to change the dynamics of the race. - The question's resolution criteria are broad. A single live debate, which can be held in-person or virtually, between presumptive nominees is sufficient for the question to resolve as 'No'. |
| Will three or more competitive Senate or governor races hold no general election debates in the following years? (2027-2028) | 58.6% | - I predict it is more likely than not (59%) that three or more competitive statewide races will have no general election debates during the 2027-2028 cycle. - Historical precedents are mixed, creating uncertainty. Reports indicate only one such instance in the 2022 cycle, but nine in the 2024 cycle. - The current political climate incentivizes candidates to avoid debates. This is driven by high polarization, risk aversion, and heightened security concerns for public officials. - The threshold of three is low compared to the number of races. The 2027 cycle includes three gubernatorial elections and the 2028 cycle includes 34 Senate elections. I expect 10-15 of these to be competitive. - A key uncertainty is how many races will be rated as competitive by the 270toWin consensus forecast. As of September 2025, these ratings are not available. |
| Will three or more competitive Senate or governor races hold no general election debates in the following years? (2025-2026) | 38.0% | - I predict a substantial minority risk (38%) that three or more competitive US Senate or governor races will hold no general election debates in 2025-2026. - This risk is elevated by a few specific contests. News reports from September 2025 indicate the Virginia lieutenant governor race has no scheduled debates and the campaigns are in public disagreement. Furthermore, the 2026 Arizona gubernatorial race is a strong candidate for this outcome, as the incumbent refused to debate in the 2022 election cycle. - Historically, it is rare for a competitive statewide race to have no debates. Public and media pressure usually result in at least one debate, which is why the probability of reaching three or more such instances remains below 50%. - Most other competitive races are likely to feature at least one debate. For example, a debate has already been scheduled for the 2025 Virginia governor's race, removing it from contention. |
| Will the U.S. presidential administration alter or delay the public release of a major federal economic indicator in the following years? (2025-2026) | 27.4% | - I predict an elevated risk (27%) of a politically motivated alteration or delay of a major US economic indicator before the end of 2026. - The President's dismissal of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Commissioner in August 2025, following a jobs report the President called "rigged," demonstrates a willingness to pressure statistical agencies. - The nominee for BLS Commissioner, E.J. Antoni, is a public critic of the agency's methodologies for the CPI and unemployment rate, creating a potential pathway for politically driven changes. - Interference remains the less likely outcome due to strong institutional norms, pre-set release calendars, and the high risk of a negative market reaction which deters overt manipulation. |
| Will the U.S. presidential administration alter or delay the public release of a major federal economic indicator in the following years? (2027-2028) | 28.4% | - I predict a material risk (28%) of the U.S. administration altering or delaying a major federal economic indicator in 2027-2028. - The August 2025 firing of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Commissioner after a negative jobs report signals a willingness to pressure independent statistical agencies. - Senior administration officials and the nominee to lead the BLS have publicly proposed delaying monthly jobs reports or shifting to quarterly releases, presenting a plausible path to a qualifying event. - A weakening economy, evidenced by slowing job growth in 2025, could create a strong political motive for interference ahead of the 2028 presidential election. - Significant institutional guardrails remain, including pre-set release calendars and the prospect of severe backlash from markets and Congress, which prevent a higher probability. |
| Will the U.S. Senate pass a reconciliation bill with no CBO input on Byrd Rule compliance in the following years? (2027-2028) | 2.9% | - I predict a very low likelihood (5%) of the Senate passing a reconciliation bill without CBO input on Byrd Rule compliance in 2027-2028. - Established Senate procedure for reconciliation bills relies on formal budgetary analysis from the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The Senate Parliamentarian uses this CBO input to enforce the Byrd Rule, which restricts bill content. - The 2025 reconciliation process serves as a strong precedent. Despite the use of aggressive procedural tactics like a 'current policy' scoring baseline, CBO analysis was still produced and used by the Parliamentarian to strip provisions from the bill. - A scenario where CBO input is bypassed would require a major break from institutional norms, such as replacing the Parliamentarian or formally accepting analysis from a partisan source. This carries significant political risks and has not been attempted previously. |
| Will the U.S. Senate pass a reconciliation bill with no CBO input on Byrd Rule compliance in the following years? (2025-2026) | 4.1% | - I predict a very low likelihood (5%) of the U.S. Senate passing a reconciliation bill in 2025-2026 without any formal CBO input for Byrd Rule determinations. - The Senate passed a reconciliation bill in July 2025, the 'One Big Beautiful Bill Act'. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provided formal cost estimates for this bill, with public reports citing its projection of a deficit increase of over $3 trillion. - The Byrd Rule restricts reconciliation to provisions with direct budgetary effects. The CBO is the established, non-partisan authority that provides the formal analysis of these effects, which the Senate Parliamentarian traditionally uses to enforce the rule. - Reports on the July 2025 bill mentioned the use of a 'current policy' baseline. This is a procedural tactic to alter the framing of budgetary impacts, but it still relies on formal analysis and scoring from the CBO. - A "Yes" outcome would require a future reconciliation bill to pass while completely bypassing this established procedure, an unprecedented break from decades of practice that would invite significant procedural and political challenges. |
| Will a U.S. cabinet agency award a $100m firm benefit after a $1m expenditure to a group or cryptocurrency linked to the president in the following years? (2027-2028) | 33.3% | - I predict a one-in-three chance that a U.S. cabinet agency will award a $100m firm benefit following a $1m expenditure to a group or cryptocurrency linked to the president in 2027-2028. - The resolution criteria are strict, requiring a publicly documented, time-linked chain of events: a cabinet agency action, a firm-specific benefit of $100m or more, and a traceable $1m+ expenditure within a 180-day window. Many recent examples of apparent influence involved independent agencies like the SEC, which do not qualify under the rules. - The risk is elevated because the administration has deep and overt financial ties to crypto ventures. A qualifying expenditure can be a simple $1m purchase of a president-linked cryptocurrency by a firm's executive, a low-friction pathway that makes the criteria easier to meet. - Cabinet agencies like the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and Department of Health and Human Services routinely issue hundreds of awards exceeding $100m. This high volume of actions creates many opportunities for a qualifying event to occur during the two-year resolution period. - News reports in 2025 documented a pattern of large expenditures to Trump-linked entities by corporate actors followed by favorable government actions, indicating a willingness by some firms to engage in behavior that could meet the resolution criteria. |
| Will a U.S. cabinet agency award a $100m firm benefit after a $1m expenditure to a group or cryptocurrency linked to the president in the following years? (2025-2026) | 22.0% | - I predict a modest but elevated risk (22%) that a qualifying quid-pro-quo event will occur by the end of 2026. The resolution criteria are highly specific, making such an event historically rare. - My forecast is elevated above the low historical base rate due to the administration's direct financial interests in cryptocurrency ventures. The existence of a president-linked stablecoin (USD1) creates a novel pathway for a firm to meet the $1 million expenditure requirement via a token purchase. - A potential qualifying event may already be in motion. A United Arab Emirates-controlled firm invested in the Trump-linked USD1 stablecoin in May 2025. Weeks later, the White House announced a deal granting the UAE greater access to advanced computer chips, an action requiring approval from the Commerce Department, a cabinet agency. - Many reported instances of large donations followed by favorable government actions do not meet the resolution criteria. These actions have often been industry-wide (e.g., easing 401k crypto rules) or taken by independent bodies, rather than being firm-specific benefits from a cabinet agency. |
| Will DOJ or FTC approve a $5bn merger or acquisition after a related $1m expenditure to a group or cryptocurrency linked to the president in the following years? (2025-2026) | 46.5% | - I predict a nearly even chance (47%) that a qualifying merger approval and expenditure will occur by the end of 2026. - The current administration's DOJ and FTC have adopted a more permissive merger enforcement policy, increasing the number of $5bn+ approvals. This coincides with a documented surge in $1 million+ contributions from corporations and executives to presidentially-linked groups. - A plausible pathway to a resolution exists. For example, reports indicate the multi-billion dollar Skydance-Paramount merger received regulatory approval after a large payment was made to a Trump-linked entity, although precise timing and definitions for resolution are unconfirmed. - The main barrier to a resolution is the strict 180-day window between a qualifying expenditure and the subsequent merger approval. Many instances of corporate giving may not align with this specific timeframe or be publicly verifiable in the required manner. - A novel and alternate route exists through cryptocurrency. A company could meet the criteria by purchasing $1 million of a president-linked crypto asset, a channel encouraged by the administration's pro-crypto stance. |
| Will DOJ or FTC approve a $5bn merger or acquisition after a related $1m expenditure to a group or cryptocurrency linked to the president in the following years? (2027-2028) | 42.7% | - I predict a significant risk (43%) of a $5bn+ merger being approved in 2027-2028 within 180 days of a related $1m+ expenditure to a presidential-linked entity. - The current administration has adopted a pro-settlement antitrust policy, which increases the total number of large merger approvals. This creates more opportunities for a qualifying event to occur. - The President and his family are linked to multiple financial entities, including super PACs and cryptocurrency ventures, that have received large contributions from corporate leaders. This provides several direct channels for a qualifying expenditure. - The resolution criteria are broad and include personal expenditures by C-suite executives. A $1 million purchase of a president-linked cryptocurrency qualifies as an expenditure, which is a novel and accessible pathway. - The probability remains below 50% because of the tight 180-day timing window and the legal and reputational risks for companies making traceable payments so close to a regulatory decision. Such a direct, publicly verifiable link is historically rare. |
| Will a SCOTUS decision weakening donor disclosure rules for political spending or electioneering communications be good law in the following years? (2025-2026) | 16.8% | - I predict a 17% chance that the Supreme Court will weaken donor disclosure rules for political spending or electioneering communications in 2025-2026. - The Supreme Court has a strong precedent of upholding disclosure for election spending, affirming federal disclosure rules by an 8-1 majority in the landmark Citizens United v. FEC (2010) case. - The Court's current conservative majority has shown support for donor privacy, notably in the 2021 Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta ruling. However, that case applied to charitable organizations, not political election spending. - No case currently on the Supreme Court's docket directly challenges disclosure rules for independent expenditures or electioneering communications. The most relevant pending case addresses a procedural question about state subpoenas, not the constitutionality of disclosure laws themselves. - While challenges to state disclosure laws are active in lower courts, a qualifying Supreme Court decision by the end of 2026 would require a rapid appeals process. |
| Will a SCOTUS decision weakening donor disclosure rules for political spending or electioneering communications be good law in the following years? (2027-2028) | 26.8% | - I predict a 27% chance that a Supreme Court decision weakening donor disclosure rules for political spending will be good law in 2027-2028. - The Supreme Court has historically upheld donor disclosure requirements, including in an 8-1 vote in the *Citizens United v. FEC* (2010) case. This creates a low base rate for a decision that weakens such rules. - The probability is elevated above the historical baseline because of the Court's current 6-3 conservative majority and its 2021 decision in *Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta*, which signaled stronger protection for donor privacy. - Several active legal challenges to state-level disclosure laws in Arizona and Maine provide plausible vehicles for a weakening decision to reach the Supreme Court and be decided within the 2027-2028 window. - A ruling could weaken disclosure by applying a stricter legal standard, raising reporting thresholds, or creating new exemptions for certain groups, even without completely striking down the principle of disclosure. |
| Will an active duty U.S. senior military leader join an election campaign or accept a civilian executive position in the following years? (2025-2026) | 11.8% | - I predict an elevated but still unlikely chance (12%) of a senior military leader accepting a proscribed political or civilian position during 2025-2026. - This event is historically very rare due to strong legal and normative barriers, chiefly DoD Directive 1344.10 and 10 U.S.C. § 973(b). - My forecast is elevated above the historical baseline because of increased politicization within the military. News reports from August 2025 describe a high rate of dismissals and turnover among senior officers. - The most credible pathway to a 'Yes' outcome is a recently retired flag officer accepting an acting or permanent civilian executive role within the six-month post-separation window specified by the question. - A senior leader formally joining an election campaign is less likely. The legal prohibitions on partisan activity for active-duty and recently separated personnel are especially stringent and highly visible. |
| Will an active duty U.S. senior military leader join an election campaign or accept a civilian executive position in the following years? (2027-2028) | 11.2% | - I predict a low probability (11%) that an active-duty U.S. senior military leader will join an election campaign or accept a civilian executive position in 2027-2028. Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 and federal law (10 U.S.C. § 973(b)) create strong legal and normative barriers against such actions. - Historically, senior military leaders who enter politics or civilian government roles almost always do so more than six months after retiring. This strong precedent establishes a very low base rate for this event occurring within the specified timeframe. - The 11% forecast is elevated above the historical baseline primarily because the 2027-2028 period contains a U.S. presidential election. This increases political demand for credible military figures to join campaigns or administrations. - The most plausible pathway to a 'Yes' is a general or flag officer retiring and then accepting a formal, paid advisory role on a campaign within six months. A violation while still on active duty is extremely unlikely. |
| Will a U.S. federal judge be impeached in a partisan vote in the following years? (2025-2026) | 18.8% | - I predict an elevated 19% chance that a federal judge will be impeached in a partisan House vote by the end of 2026. - The impeachment of federal judges is historically rare. Only 15 have been impeached by the House, and modern cases since 1986 have passed with overwhelming bipartisan support. - The risk is elevated due to explicit calls from President Trump for the impeachment of specific judges, such as U.S. District Judge James Boasberg in March 2025. House Republicans have introduced articles of impeachment against multiple judges. - Strong institutional and public opposition limits the probability. A July 2025 Marquette Law School poll shows that about two-thirds of the public opposes impeaching judges for their rulings. Chief Justice John Roberts has also publicly rebuked the idea. - An external forecast on a similar question places the probability of a Republican-led partisan impeachment at 17%, providing a consistent anchor for this prediction. |
| Will a U.S. federal judge be impeached in a partisan vote in the following years? (2027-2028) | 8.3% | - I predict a low probability (8%) that a U.S. federal judge will be impeached in a partisan vote during the 2027-2028 period. - Historically, impeachment of federal judges is extremely rare, with only 15 cases since 1797. Modern impeachments (e.g., 2009, 2010) have been reserved for serious misconduct and passed with overwhelming bipartisan or unanimous support, making a partisan impeachment unprecedented in the modern era. - The risk is elevated above the historical baseline due to explicit calls from President Trump and his allies since March 2025 to impeach judges over policy disagreements, such as the case of U.S. District Judge James Boasberg. - Strong countervailing forces make this unlikely. Chief Justice John Roberts and other senior judges have publicly reinforced that impeachment is not a tool for challenging judicial decisions. A House majority would also need to weigh the political costs of such a move in a presidential election cycle. - A "Yes" outcome would likely require Republicans to control the House after the 2026 midterms and for a politically-charged judicial ruling to occur, creating a test case for a leadership willing to break with institutional norms for a symbolic impeachment. |
| Will a U.S. federal court hold any part of the executive branch in contempt for not obeying a federal court ruling in the following years? (2025-2026) | 41.2% | - I predict a substantial chance (41%) that a U.S. federal court will hold the executive branch in contempt before the end of 2026. - The risk is elevated by the Trump administration's frequent non-compliance with court orders in 2025. A July 2025 report alleged the administration ignored over one-third of adverse court rulings. Federal judges have characterized the administration's conduct as a 'willful and bad faith refusal to comply'. - Some federal judges have shown a willingness to use contempt powers. In April 2025, a district court judge found probable cause for criminal contempt against executive officials for defying a court order in an immigration case. - A key factor against this outcome is the judiciary's institutional restraint. Appellate courts have intervened to block contempt proceedings initiated by lower courts, citing separation-of-powers concerns. To date, judges have largely avoided issuing formal contempt orders despite numerous provocations. - A 'Yes' resolution can be triggered by a single contempt finding from any federal court, even if that finding is later reversed. This broadens the pathway for a 'Yes' outcome. |
| Will a U.S. federal court hold any part of the executive branch in contempt for not obeying a federal court ruling in the following years? (2027-2028) | 46.2% | - I predict a moderate likelihood, 46 percent, that a U.S. federal court will hold the executive branch in contempt during 2027-2028. - This forecast is significantly elevated above the low historical rate of such events. The increase is driven by numerous documented clashes between the executive branch and federal courts in 2025. - Multiple federal judges have found that the executive branch engaged in "willful disregard" or "flagrant violation" of court orders. These cases involve issues ranging from immigration to the freezing of federal funds. - Countervailing this, appellate courts have demonstrated a willingness to block contempt proceedings against executive officials. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a district judge's contempt-related order in August 2025, showing a high barrier to such findings. - The question resolves as 'Yes' even if a contempt finding is later reversed. This lowers the effective bar, as it only requires a single district court to issue a formal order, which could be short-lived. |
| In the following years, will the DOJ decline to act on a criminal contempt referral of a current or former executive official who served under the sitting president? (2025-2026) | 10.2% | - I predict a low probability (10%) that the Department of Justice (DOJ) will decline a criminal contempt referral in 2025-2026. - A criminal contempt referral is unlikely because the same party controls both Congress and the White House. - Historically, DOJ declinations to prosecute officials like Attorney General Holder in 2012 and Attorney General Barr in 2019 followed referrals from an opposition-controlled House. - The primary path to this event is a bipartisan vote for contempt in the narrowly-divided House, likely stemming from an unusually contentious oversight fight. - If a referral were to happen, the DOJ would very likely decline to act, consistent with its long-standing policy regarding executive privilege assertions. |
| In the following years, will the DOJ decline to act on a criminal contempt referral of a current or former executive official who served under the sitting president? (2027-2028) | 39.6% | - I predict a 40% chance that the Department of Justice (DOJ) will decline to act on a criminal contempt referral in 2027-2028. This outcome is largely contingent on the opposition party winning control of at least one chamber of Congress in the 2026 midterm elections, which would make a contempt referral of a Trump administration official plausible. - The DOJ has a historical precedent of declining to prosecute executive branch officials for contempt of Congress, particularly when executive privilege is invoked, as seen in the cases of Attorney General Barr in 2019 and Attorney General Holder in 2012. - Reporting in 2025 on the DOJ's priorities and confrontational posture reinforces the high likelihood of a declination if a referral is made. However, the probability is not higher because of the question's strict definition of 'declines to act.' The DOJ could prevent a 'Yes' resolution by opening a nominal investigation, even if it has no intention of ever pursuing charges. |
| Will both Kalshi and Polymarket assign >20% odds to the major-party nomination of an already twice-elected former U.S. president in the following years? (2025-2026) | 2.3% | - I predict a low probability (5%) that both Kalshi and Polymarket will assign greater than 20% odds to a twice-elected former president's 2028 nomination. - The 22nd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits any person from being elected president more than twice. There is a broad consensus among legal scholars that this restriction is unambiguous. - Current prediction market odds align with the legal consensus. In August and September 2025, reports indicated Donald Trump's odds for the 2028 Republican nomination were approximately 6% on Kalshi and 3% to win the election on Polymarket. - A proposed workaround where a former president runs for Vice President is broadly dismissed by legal experts due to the 12th Amendment, which makes anyone ineligible for the presidency also ineligible for the vice presidency. - A 'Yes' resolution would likely require a significant political or legal event, such as a credible challenge to the 22nd Amendment, creating a sustained speculative increase in odds on both platforms. |
| Will both Kalshi and Polymarket assign >20% odds to the major-party nomination of an already twice-elected former U.S. president in the following years? (2027-2028) | 4.2% | - I predict a low probability (5%) that Kalshi and Polymarket will price the 2028 major-party nomination of an already twice-elected former president above 20%. - The 22nd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars any individual from being elected president more than twice, making any such candidate legally ineligible. - As of mid-2025, prediction markets on both Kalshi and Polymarket price Donald Trump's 2028 nomination odds between 3% and 6%, substantially below the 20% threshold. - A path to a "Yes" resolution would likely require a credible legal or political movement to challenge or reinterpret the 22nd Amendment, which has not materialized. - Sustaining a price above 20% for 24 hours on two separate platforms is a high bar, as professional traders would likely view it as a mispricing and bet against it, correcting the price downwards. |
| Will the U.S. President or another executive branch official direct federal law enforcement to not enforce a federal court order in the following years? (2025-2026) | 21.7% | - I predict a 22% chance that a senior executive branch official will direct federal law enforcement to not enforce a federal court order in 2025 or 2026. - Such a directive is extraordinarily rare in modern U.S. history, establishing a very low baseline probability for this event. - The risk is elevated due to multiple 2025 incidents where executive branch agencies appeared to ignore federal court orders, particularly regarding deportation flights in March and September, and by whistleblower claims that senior officials have encouraged defying the judiciary. - The question's resolution criteria are strict, requiring a documented or directly-corroborated directive to a federal law enforcement agency like the U.S. Marshals Service, which has not yet been observed. - The incidents reported so far involve agency non-compliance with orders directed at them, rather than an explicit directive to law enforcement to refuse enforcement, a distinction that allows for plausible deniability. |
| Will the U.S. President or another executive branch official direct federal law enforcement to not enforce a federal court order in the following years? (2027-2028) | 19.8% | - I predict an elevated risk (20%) that the executive branch will direct federal law enforcement to not enforce a federal court order in 2027-2028. - An explicit directive for federal law enforcement to defy a court order is historically rare in the United States. The baseline probability for such an event in any two-year period is near zero. - The risk is elevated because of multiple instances in 2025 where the executive branch did not comply with court orders, particularly in immigration cases. News reports and whistleblower accounts suggest an administration willing to challenge judicial authority. - A "No" outcome is more probable. The executive branch has typically favored legal workarounds, such as finding new legal justifications for a policy or seeking emergency stays from higher courts, rather than issuing a direct non-enforcement order to law enforcement. - A plausible pathway to a "Yes" resolution involves an acute crisis, potentially over immigration or the 2028 election. This could precipitate an explicit and documented order to the U.S. Marshals Service or another federal agency to refuse to carry out a court-mandated action. |
| Will the habeas corpus be suspended for any group of people within the United States in any of the following years? (2025-2026) | 7.3% | - I predict a low probability (7%) of a formal suspension of habeas corpus for any group of people in 2025-2026. - Senior administration officials stated in May 2025 an intent to suspend habeas corpus to expedite deportations, citing the constitutional provision for "invasion". - The judiciary presents a significant obstacle to suspension. In an April 2025 ruling, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the right to habeas corpus review for detainees subject to removal under the Alien Enemies Act. - A September 2025 ruling by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals halted the administration's use of the Alien Enemies Act, undermining a key justification for suspending habeas corpus. - Unilateral presidential suspensions of habeas corpus are historically rare. Modern Supreme Court precedent, such as Boumediene v. Bush (2008), strongly protects habeas rights from executive overreach. |
| Will the habeas corpus be suspended for any group of people within the United States in any of the following years? (2027-2028) | 7.5% | - I predict a low probability (8%) of the U.S. President formally suspending habeas corpus for any group during 2027-2028. - The U.S. Constitution permits suspension only in cases of rebellion or invasion. This power is generally understood to reside with Congress, not the President. - The judiciary presents a major obstacle. In 2025, the Supreme Court affirmed habeas rights for individuals targeted under the Alien Enemies Act, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals blocked that Act's use for deportations. - A pathway to suspension exists if the President declares a border-related "invasion" to justify an executive order. A senior advisor confirmed in May 2025 this was being "actively" explored. |
| Will U.S. federal military forces be deployed for non-routine domestic missions in three or more large metro areas in the following years? (2027-2028) | 18.6% | - I predict a one-in-five chance of federal military deployments in three or more large metro areas during 2027-2028. - The current administration has demonstrated a high willingness to use federal forces domestically, conducting two qualifying deployments in 2025 in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. - President Trump has explicitly threatened further deployments in cities including Chicago, Baltimore, and Memphis, citing crime as the primary justification. - Historically, such deployments are extremely rare. No two-year period since 1945 has seen three or more deployments in large metro areas. - Significant legal and political headwinds exist. A federal court ruled the 2025 Los Angeles deployment violated the Posse Comitatus Act, and governors in targeted cities have pledged to resist future federal intervention. |
| Will U.S. federal military forces be deployed for non-routine domestic missions in three or more large metro areas in the following years? (2025-2026) | 45.6% | - I predict a 46% probability of at least one more non-routine domestic military deployment by the end of 2026, which would mean a total of three or more for 2025-2026. - Two qualifying deployments have already occurred in 2025, in the Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. metropolitan areas. - The primary driver for an additional deployment is the administration's explicit intent. The President has repeatedly targeted Chicago and announced a 'Memphis Safe Task Force' on September 15, 2025. - Significant legal and political opposition makes further deployments less likely. A U.S. District Court ruled the 2025 Los Angeles deployment illegal, and governors in states like Illinois have pledged to fight federal intervention in court. - The 54% chance of no further deployments reflects the high probability that this legal and political resistance will successfully block or delay action past the end of 2026. |
| Will senior DOJ leaders override normal procedures to open or accelerate a case against a high-profile presidential opponent or critic in the following years? (2027-2028) | 69.8% | - I predict a 70% chance that senior DOJ leaders will override normal procedures to target a presidential opponent or critic between 2027 and 2028. - Multiple credible reports from 2025 indicate the Department of Justice has already taken politically-motivated actions. These include creating a "Weaponization Working Group" and initiating investigations into high-profile opponents such as New York Attorney General Letitia James and Senator Adam Schiff. - External forecasts indicate a 75% chance that a key procedural safeguard, the requirement to consult the Public Integrity Section before prosecuting lawmakers, will be removed by late 2026. This would lower institutional barriers to politically-driven prosecutions. - Senior DOJ leadership has already shown a willingness to bypass normal procedure. According to news reports citing court records, the Deputy Attorney General personally ordered the arrest of a New Jersey mayor in May 2025. - While such overt political intervention has been historically rare, lawsuits filed by fired FBI officials and federal prosecutors in 2025 allege a systematic politicization of the Justice Department and a campaign of retribution against officials perceived as disloyal. |
| Will senior DOJ leaders override normal procedures to open or accelerate a case against a high-profile presidential opponent or critic in the following years? (2025-2026) | 62.4% | - I predict a 62% chance that senior DOJ leaders will override normal procedures to target a presidential opponent before the end of 2026. - In 2025, the DOJ’s Public Integrity Section was reportedly stripped of its authority to review corruption cases against public officials. This removes a key procedural safeguard designed to prevent politically motivated prosecutions. - Multiple credible sources from August-September 2025 report that investigations have been initiated against high-profile presidential critics, including John Bolton, Adam Schiff, and Letitia James. - Attorney General Pam Bondi appointed a special prosecutor to investigate Schiff and James. This follows an executive order directing the DOJ to investigate other critics like Miles Taylor and Chris Krebs. - Whistleblower lawsuits allege that senior DOJ and FBI officials have directly pressured staff to pursue cases based on political loyalty and have retaliated against those who refused. |
| Will senior DOJ leaders override normal procedures to protect the President, his family, or his allies from a legal case in the following years? (2027-2028) | 63.6% | - I predict a 64% chance that senior DOJ leaders will override normal procedures to protect the President or his allies during the 2027-2028 period. This forecast is driven by numerous reports from 2025 indicating a significant and intentional politicization of the Department of Justice. - Specific actions supporting this conclusion include the downsizing of the DOJ's Public Integrity Section, the termination of several anti-corruption task forces, and the weakening of rules limiting contact between the White House and federal prosecutors. - Whistleblower complaints from 2025 allege that senior DOJ officials have directed staff to defy court orders. This, along with mass resignations of career attorneys citing pressure to take unethical positions, signals that norms of prosecutorial independence are already being eroded. - While overt interference is historically rare, the current administration has demonstrated a willingness to challenge institutional norms. The two-year window occurs late in the presidential term, when incentives to protect allies are high, elevating the risk well above the historical baseline. |
| Will senior DOJ leaders override normal procedures to protect the President, his family, or his allies from a legal case in the following years? (2025-2026) | 66.0% | - I predict a 66% likelihood that senior DOJ leaders will override normal procedures to protect the President, his family, or his allies during 2025-2026. This assessment is based on multiple credible reports of DOJ politicization since January 2025. - Recent events provide concrete examples of interference with career staff. These include the firing of a senior lawyer who refused to sign a court filing he considered misleading, and a separate case where a federal judge noted "serious questions" about DOJ interference in a preliminary injunction. - There are specific allegations of protective actions on behalf of the President. A lawsuit, citing a senior congressional memo, claims the DOJ's review of Jeffrey Epstein files was steered to protect President Trump, with staff instructed to flag all mentions of him. - Broader procedural safeguards are reportedly being weakened. External forecasts suggest a 75% probability that the DOJ will remove a key rule requiring central review of politically sensitive cases, making future procedural overrides easier and less transparent. |
| Will the Department of Justice indict a high-profile individual from the opposing party to the U.S. president in the following years? (2025-2026) | 57.5% | - I predict a better-than-even chance (57%) that the Department of Justice will announce a new investigation or prosecution of a qualifying high-profile Democrat by the end of 2026. - Reporting from August and September 2025 indicates the DOJ has initiated a grand jury investigation related to former President Barack Obama and a separate criminal investigation into Senator Adam Schiff. Both individuals are qualifying targets under the question's criteria. - The DOJ under Attorney General Pam Bondi has established a 'Weaponization Working Group', signaling a formal departure from norms of prosecutorial independence. Senior administration officials have also publicly predicted indictments of political opponents. - The question resolves on the public announcement of an investigation, not an indictment or conviction. This is a lower bar, making a 'Yes' outcome more plausible within the remaining 15-month timeframe. - The probability is not higher due to significant institutional constraints. The DOJ historically avoids announcing investigations, and legal challenges or internal resistance could delay a formal announcement beyond 2026. |
| Will the Department of Justice indict a high-profile individual from the opposing party to the U.S. president in the following years? (2027-2028) | 60.5% | - I predict a 60% likelihood the Department of Justice will announce a new investigation or prosecution of a high-profile Democrat between 2027 and 2028. - The current Department of Justice has already taken steps to investigate political opponents as of September 2025. These actions include a grand jury probe into Obama-era officials and an investigation concerning Senator Adam Schiff. - Historically, such actions against top opposition leaders were extremely rare. The indictment of a former president under the preceding administration broke with this norm, increasing the baseline likelihood of politically-charged prosecutions. - The question will resolve as "Yes" with only a publicly announced investigation, not an indictment or conviction. The pool of qualifying targets is large, including former presidents, congressional leaders, and numerous impeachment managers. |
| Will the sitting U.S. president’s net worth reach ≥4x its value before they were elected at any point in the following years? (2027-2028) | 32.2% | - I predict a one-in-three chance (32%) that Donald Trump's net worth will reach $10.4 billion during 2027-2028. This target represents a four-fold increase from his estimated $2.6 billion net worth in January 2024. As of September 2025, his net worth is estimated at $7.3 billion. - The primary path to reaching this threshold is through a speculative rally in his highly volatile cryptocurrency holdings. Ventures like World Liberty Financial, which have already added billions to his on-paper wealth, could experience sharp price increases fueled by the pro-crypto regulatory environment his administration has fostered. - Significant obstacles make this outcome unlikely. Forbes, the question's arbiter, may apply substantial discounts to illiquid or locked crypto assets in its valuation, or its reporting cadence may miss a brief price spike. Historically, no U.S. president's wealth has quadrupled while in office. - While the fortunes of some billionaires with volatile public holdings have quadrupled in a similar timeframe, Trump's more traditional assets in real estate and media are unlikely to grow enough to bridge the gap. The resolution of this question depends almost entirely on the performance of his crypto ventures. |
| Will the sitting U.S. president’s net worth reach ≥4x its value before they were elected at any point in the following years? (2025-2026) | 33.8% | - I predict a one-in-three chance (34%) that Donald Trump's net worth will reach or exceed $10.4 billion before the end of 2026. This threshold is four times his January 2024 valuation of $2.6 billion. - Forbes estimated Trump's net worth at $7.3 billion as of September 2025. This leaves a $3.1 billion gap, requiring an approximate 42% increase in value to meet the threshold within the remaining 15-month window. - The most plausible path to reaching the threshold is a significant rally in Trump's cryptocurrency-related assets. These holdings have been the primary driver of his recent wealth increase and are supported by his administration's pro-crypto policies. - The main factor weighing against this outcome is Forbes's conservative valuation methodology, which is the official source for this question. Forbes is likely to apply significant discounts to illiquid or locked assets, such as unvested crypto tokens, meaning the 'on-paper' value may not be fully recognized. - Further uncertainty stems from the high volatility of assets like his stake in Trump Media & Technology Group (DJT) and ambiguity over how Forbes will attribute wealth held in family trusts. |
| Question | Probability | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Will at least 10 individuals affiliated with the U.S. president receive a presidential pardon or commutation in the following years? (2027-2028) | 48.1% | - I predict a near-even chance (48%) that at least 10 individuals affiliated with the U.S. president will receive clemency in the 2027-2028 period. - President Trump has previously exceeded this threshold. During his 2017-2021 term, he granted clemency to at least 16 individuals who met the current definition of an affiliate. - The question window, from January 1, 2027, to January 20, 2029, includes the end of the presidential term. This is a period when presidents have historically issued a high volume of pardons, including politically sensitive ones. - The question's definition of 'affiliated' is broad, covering not only high-level appointees but also campaign volunteers and employees of the president's businesses. This expands the pool of potential recipients, making the threshold more attainable. |
| Will at least 10 individuals affiliated with the U.S. president receive a presidential pardon or commutation in the following years? (2025-2026) | 48.1% | - I predict a near-even chance (48%) of at least 10 presidential affiliates receiving clemency by the end of 2026. - This forecast balances the near-zero rate of such pardons in the first two years of past presidencies against the current administration's atypical use of clemency. - The primary path to a 'Yes' resolution involves the mass clemency reportedly granted to January 6 participants in early 2025. The broad definition of "affiliate," which includes campaign volunteers and elected officials in the president's party, makes it plausible that at least 10 recipients qualify. - Conversely, despite the large number of pardons issued, there is not yet public evidence confirming that 10 recipients verifiably meet the strict affiliation criteria. Historically, presidents since 1993 have granted almost no such pardons this early in a term. - Additional affiliate pardons could occur in the ~15 months remaining. Public requests for clemency for figures like former Republican Congressman George Santos, who would qualify as an affiliate, contribute to this possibility. |
| Will the U.S. federal government open formal investigations of at least 5 top-50 universities in the following years? (2027-2028) | 73.2% | - I predict a high probability (73%) that the U.S. federal government will open formal investigations into at least five top-50 universities between 2027 and 2028. - This forecast is driven by a major shift in federal oversight that began in 2025. News reports from that year detail a multi-agency campaign by the Departments of Education, Justice, and Health and Human Services that launched over 100 investigations into universities. - Many of the 2025 investigations targeted top-50 universities, and administration officials have publicly signaled their intent to continue this pressure, with one calling an early settlement with Columbia University a "template for other universities." - This level of federal activity is a sharp break from historical precedent. For example, the DOJ's 'China Initiative' (2018-2022) resulted in investigations at five top-50 schools over more than three years, a much lower rate. This low base rate is the primary reason the forecast is not a near-certainty. |
| Will two or more U.S. state or federal judges or legislators be victims of murder or attempted murder by non-state actors in the following years? (2027-2028) | 36.1% | - I predict a significant risk (36%), or roughly a one-in-three chance, that two or more U.S. judges or legislators will be victims of murder or attempted murder in 2027-2028. - This risk is elevated compared to the historical base rate. Since 2000, approximately 3 in 13 two-year periods (23%) have met this two-victim threshold. - The higher forecast reflects a documented surge in credible threats against public officials, as reported by the U.S. Marshals Service and U.S. Capitol Police. - Recent events demonstrate an increased potential for multi-victim incidents. The 2025 attack on Minnesota legislators, for instance, involved a single perpetrator targeting multiple lawmakers. - The 2027-2028 forecast window includes a U.S. presidential election, a period historically associated with heightened political tensions and increased risk of violence. |
| Will the U.S. president formally invoke the Insurrection Act in the following years? (2025-2026) | 22.2% | - I predict a 22% chance, or a roughly one-in-five risk, that the U.S. president will formally invoke the Insurrection Act in 2025 or 2026. - The Insurrection Act has not been formally invoked since 1992. This long period without use establishes a very low historical base rate against an invocation. - The current risk is elevated because the administration has already deployed military forces for domestic law enforcement purposes in cities like Los Angeles, signalling a willingness to take such action. - A September 2025 federal court ruling found a recent military deployment in Los Angeles violated the Posse Comitatus Act. The ruling also noted that the Insurrection Act is the specific legal exception required for such deployments, creating a direct incentive for the administration to formally invoke it to achieve similar goals in the future. - The administration has publicly stated its intent to expand domestic troop deployments to other cities. The remaining 15-month timeframe, which includes the 2026 midterm elections, contains plausible triggers for civil unrest that could prompt an invocation. |
| Will the U.S. president formally invoke the Insurrection Act in the following years? (2027-2028) | 16.0% | - I predict a one-in-six chance (16%) that the U.S. president formally invokes the Insurrection Act during 2027-2028. - Formal invocations of the Insurrection Act are historically rare, with the last instance occurring in 1992. The risk is elevated above this baseline due to the current administration's repeated signaling and actions deploying military forces for domestic law enforcement. - The president has so far relied on alternative legal authorities to deploy the National Guard, such as those in Title 10 and Title 32 of the U.S. Code. These methods have been used for deployments in multiple U.S. cities in 2025. - A primary pathway to a formal invocation would be if these alternative legal authorities are successfully challenged in court, leaving the Insurrection Act as the most direct authority for the administration to act on its stated domestic security goals. - The 2028 presidential election year is a period of heightened risk for significant civil unrest, which could serve as a catalyst for an invocation. |
| Will the White House direct federal agencies to target three or more high-profile presidential critics in the following years? (2027-2028) | 68.0% | - I predict a 68% likelihood the White House will direct federal agencies to target three or more high-profile critics between 2027 and 2028. - This forecast is based on a documented pattern of similar actions in 2025. These include executive orders for the Justice Department to investigate critics like Miles Taylor and Christopher Krebs, and grand jury probes against opponents such as Letitia James and Adam Schiff. - The resolution threshold is low, requiring documented directives against just three individuals over a two-year period. The administration's use of formal instruments, such as executive orders, and its replacement of uncooperative officials makes it probable this evidentiary standard will be met. - Historically, such explicit directives are rare; the Nixon administration's 'enemies list' is the main precedent. The 32% chance of a 'No' verdict accounts for potential constraints from judicial review, internal agency resistance, and political blowback. |
| Will the Department of Justice file criminal charges against one or more journalists under the Espionage Act in the following years? (2025-2026) | 15.4% | - I predict an elevated but unlikely chance (15%) that the Department of Justice will file Espionage Act charges against a journalist before the end of 2026. - Historically, the U.S. government has not prosecuted journalists for publishing classified information, creating a strong precedent against such an action. Even during periods of aggressive leak investigations, the Department of Justice has focused on government sources, not reporters. - The risk is elevated above the historical baseline due to the current administration’s public rhetoric and actions. President Trump and other officials have explicitly suggested prosecuting journalists, and the administration has demonstrated a willingness to replace Justice Department personnel perceived as obstacles to politically sensitive cases. - The 2019 indictment of Julian Assange under the Espionage Act, while a unique case, has lowered the barrier for using the law against individuals who publish classified information. - A plausible pathway for this event does not require a successful conviction. The question resolves as Yes if charges are merely filed, which could be pursued as a political act or a legal test case even with a low probability of winning in court. |
| Will the Department of Justice file criminal charges against one or more journalists under the Espionage Act in the following years? (2027-2028) | 13.0% | - I predict an elevated risk (13%) that the Department of Justice will file Espionage Act charges against a journalist in 2027–2028. - Prosecutions of journalists under the Espionage Act are historically almost nonexistent; the Department of Justice has instead targeted government employees who leak classified information. The recent guilty plea of Julian Assange is a notable but exceptional case involving a publisher. - The risk is elevated by public statements from administration officials endorsing the prosecution of news organizations like CNN, as reported in July 2025. - Significant legal and institutional barriers persist, including First Amendment protections. The government previously considered but delayed Espionage Act charges against The New York Times due to these same concerns. - The question resolves on charges being filed, not on a conviction. This lowers the threshold for a positive resolution if the administration seeks to create a deterrent effect or test legal boundaries. |
| In the following years, will any U.S. state or the District of Columbia no longer have a previously existing anti-SLAPP law? (2025-2026) | 9.2% | - I predict a low probability (9%) that any U.S. state or the District of Columbia will eliminate core anti-SLAPP provisions before 2027. - The recent and dominant trend is for states to strengthen anti-SLAPP laws, not weaken them. Multiple states adopted versions of the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA) in 2025, and Idaho’s is scheduled to take effect in 2026. - The primary pathway to a "Yes" outcome is a state supreme court striking down a law on constitutional grounds. This happened in Washington (2015) and Minnesota (2017), though both states later enacted stronger laws. - A legislative amendment that removes fee-shifting or discovery-stay protections for a subset of cases would also trigger a "Yes" resolution. I found no information about current legislative efforts aimed at such a rollback. - Modern UPEPA-style statutes are drafted to be more resilient to the legal challenges that led to past invalidations. However, with 39 jurisdictions having these laws, a single adverse court ruling or legislative change remains a small but non-zero risk within the forecast period. |
| In the following years, will any U.S. state or the District of Columbia no longer have a previously existing anti-SLAPP law? (2027-2028) | 18.4% | - I predict an 18% chance, or roughly one-in-five, that a US state or the District of Columbia will weaken its anti-SLAPP law in 2027-2028. - The dominant trend is for states to adopt or strengthen these laws, which makes a weakening event unlikely. Since 2022, at least 12 states have passed new or improved laws, often based on the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA) model. - The primary risk comes from state courts. State supreme courts have previously found anti-SLAPP statutes unconstitutional, as occurred in Washington in 2015 and Minnesota in 2017. - A 'Yes' outcome could also result from legislative action. A state legislature could create carve-outs that remove fee-shifting or discovery-stay protections for specific kinds of lawsuits. - The 18% forecast aggregates this low-probability risk across the 39 jurisdictions with anti-SLAPP laws over the two-year period. |
| Will New York Times v. Sullivan no longer be good law in the following years? (2025-2026) | 11.4% | - I predict an 11% chance the Supreme Court will overturn or materially narrow New York Times v. Sullivan by the end of 2026. - Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch have publicly called to reconsider the precedent. This creates a real possibility of the Court taking up a case to review the standard. - Overturning a 60-year-old landmark precedent is a high bar due to stare decisis. The Sullivan standard is foundational to First Amendment law and has deep reliance interests across the media and legal systems. - The most plausible path to a “Yes” resolution is a narrowing of the definition of a “public figure” rather than a complete reversal of the “actual malice” standard. - The timeframe is a key constraint. For a decision to be issued by the end of 2026, the Supreme Court would likely need to accept a case for review by early 2026, and no such case is currently before the court. |
| Will New York Times v. Sullivan no longer be good law in the following years? (2027-2028) | 21.2% | - I predict a one-in-five chance (21%) that New York Times v. Sullivan will be overturned or materially narrowed by the end of 2028. - The risk is primarily driven by public calls from Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch to reconsider the 1964 precedent. - A campaign to overturn the ruling provides potential test cases for the Court, including lawsuits by Donald Trump and a September 2025 11th Circuit judicial opinion urging review. - Sullivan is a 60-year-old precedent. Strong reliance interests from the press and public make overturning it a high bar. - A majority to overturn is not apparent. The Supreme Court has recently and repeatedly denied petitions to reconsider Sullivan, and key justices like the Chief Justice have not indicated support for a change. |
| Will the U.S. government seek to revoke a naturalized citizen's citizenship for post-naturalization conduct in the following years? (2025-2026) | 17.6% | - I predict an 18% chance that the U.S. government will seek to revoke a naturalized citizen's citizenship for post-naturalization conduct during 2025 or 2026. - The historical precedent for such an action is virtually nonexistent. For over 60 years, denaturalization cases have been pursued almost exclusively on the grounds of fraud or misrepresentation committed before citizenship was granted. - The elevated risk stems from a June 2025 Department of Justice memo directing U.S. attorneys to "maximally pursue denaturalization proceedings in all cases permitted by law," signaling a major policy shift from decades of practice. - The most plausible pathway to this event is the government filing a test case based on a specific statutory provision, such as membership in a designated terrorist or totalitarian organization within five years of naturalization. - The primary constraint on this action is the high legal burden of proof and the preference of government lawyers to pursue cases based on pre-naturalization fraud, which have a stronger track record of success in court. |
| Will the U.S. government seek to revoke a naturalized citizen's citizenship for post-naturalization conduct in the following years? (2027-2028) | 25.9% | - I predict a one-in-four chance (26%) that the U.S. government will file to revoke a citizen's citizenship for post-naturalization conduct in 2027-2028. - This forecast is elevated significantly above the historical baseline. There are no known cases of the government seeking revocation primarily for post-naturalization conduct in over 60 years. - The primary driver for this increased risk is a June 2025 Department of Justice memo. The memo directs attorneys to "maximally pursue denaturalization proceedings" and lists priority categories including post-naturalization acts. - A legal pathway for a filing exists under 8 U.S.C. § 1451. This statute includes provisions concerning affiliation with certain organizations within five years of naturalization. - Significant legal hurdles keep the probability low. These include a high evidentiary burden and Supreme Court precedents that protect citizenship, which may deter the government from initiating a test case despite the new policy. |
| Will U.S. authorities transfer any current or former U.S. citizen to a prison abroad in the following years? (2025-2026) | 7.3% | - I predict a low but notable risk (7%) of the U.S. transferring a citizen to a foreign prison without their consent before 2027. - There is no modern precedent for such a transfer. U.S. law requires voluntary consent for international prisoner transfers, and any non-consensual transfer would face significant constitutional challenges. - The risk is elevated due to President Trump's public proposals in 2025 to send U.S. prisoners to El Salvador. El Salvador's President, Nayib Bukele, has indicated a willingness to accept them. - The most plausible scenario is an administrative error. U.S. authorities have previously misclassified and wrongfully deported U.S. citizens. A similar mistake during a transfer of non-citizens would trigger a Yes resolution. - An operational pathway for such transfers already exists. In 2025, the U.S. began transferring non-citizen migrants to El Salvador’s CECOT prison, demonstrating a logistical capability and a willingness to use foreign facilities. |
| Will U.S. authorities transfer any current or former U.S. citizen to a prison abroad in the following years? (2027-2028) | 8.4% | - I predict an elevated risk (8%) that the U.S. will involuntarily transfer at least one citizen or former citizen to a foreign prison in 2027-2028. - This risk is elevated because the U.S. government has created operational pathways to transfer non-citizens to prisons in third countries. President Trump has also publicly expressed a desire to send U.S. citizens to these prisons. - The most plausible pathway to a transfer is an administrative error. A U.S. citizen could be misidentified as a non-citizen and transferred to a foreign prison as part of an existing removal program, which would count for resolution. - A deliberate, large-scale policy to transfer U.S. citizens is improbable. Such a policy would face immediate and likely successful legal challenges based on the U.S. Constitution, particularly the Eighth Amendment. |
| Will any U.S. authority refuse to recognize the citizenship of U.S.-born children of non-citizen parents for 90 days in the following years? (2027-2028) | 11.2% | - I predict an 11% chance that a U.S. authority will deny birthright citizenship recognition for 90 days in 2027-2028. - Birthright citizenship is established by the 14th Amendment and the 1898 Supreme Court case United States v. Wong Kim Ark. No U.S. authority has successfully denied it for a prolonged period in modern history. - President Trump's January 2025 Executive Order 14160, which aims to restrict birthright citizenship, is currently blocked by multiple federal court injunctions. - The Supreme Court is expected to rule on the executive order's constitutionality by mid-2026. This decision is the pivotal factor for this forecast. - A "Yes" resolution likely requires the Supreme Court to permit restrictions on birthright citizenship. If that occurs, federal agencies and some states are prepared to implement policies that could lead to a 90-day denial of recognition. |
| Will any U.S. authority refuse to recognize the citizenship of U.S.-born children of non-citizen parents for 90 days in the following years? (2025-2026) | 7.4% | - I predict a low probability (7%) of any U.S. authority successfully denying citizenship to U.S.-born children of non-citizens for 90 consecutive days before the end of 2026. - President Trump's January 2025 Executive Order 14160, which aims to limit birthright citizenship, remains blocked by multiple federal court injunctions. These injunctions have been sustained through nationwide class-action lawsuits. - A 'Yes' resolution likely requires a favorable Supreme Court ruling that either overturns the 1898 *United States v. Wong Kim Ark* precedent or vacates the current injunctions, creating a window for enforcement. - Despite the legal blocks, federal agencies including the Social Security Administration and USCIS have prepared detailed implementation plans. This administrative readiness means a denial policy could be activated rapidly if courts permit it. - There is no modern historical precedent for a U.S. authority successfully denying birthright citizenship for a sustained period, as the principle is firmly established in constitutional law. |
| Will U.S. Congress pass new limits on early voting, absentee voting, or voter registration in the following years? (2027-2028) | 48.4% | - I predict a 48% chance of at least one congressional chamber approving new voting restrictions in 2027–2028. The legislation need not become law for the question to resolve as Yes. - The most plausible path is the House of Representatives passing a restrictive measure with a simple majority. The Republican-controlled House passed the Safeguard American Voter Eligibility (SAVE) Act in 2025, providing a recent precedent. - The outcome largely hinges on which party controls the House of Representatives after the 2026 midterm elections. The result of these elections is a key uncertainty. - Passage in the Senate is less probable than in the House. Senate rules, specifically the filibuster, create a higher procedural hurdle for controversial legislation. - Federal legislation has historically expanded voting access more often than it has restricted it. The 48% probability is elevated above this historical baseline due to the recent and repeated efforts to pass restrictions in the House. |
| Will an opposing-party authority block or remove a major-party nominee for statewide office from the U.S. general-election ballot in the following years? (2025-2026) | 2.8% | - I predict a very low chance (5%) of an opposing-party authority removing a major-party statewide nominee from a general-election ballot in 2025-2026. - There is no modern precedent for such a removal after a candidate has secured their party's nomination. - Recent high-profile attempts to remove presidential candidates from 2024 general election ballots were unsuccessful, demonstrating strong institutional and judicial resistance to such actions. - The risk is elevated above the historical baseline due to high partisan tensions. The numerous statewide races in 2026 provide multiple opportunities for such a challenge to occur. - A plausible pathway to a 'Yes' resolution involves the post-nomination discovery of a clear-cut statutory disqualification, for example an undeniable failure to meet residency requirements. |
| Will an opposing-party authority block or remove a major-party nominee for statewide office from the U.S. general-election ballot in the following years? (2027-2028) | 3.1% | - I predict a low probability (5%) of a major-party statewide nominee being removed from a 2027-2028 general election ballot by an opposing party. There is no modern precedent for this event occurring after a nominee has been officially certified. - Attempts to remove Donald Trump from the 2024 presidential ballot were ultimately rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. This case established a precedent that strong legal and institutional backstops exist to prevent such removals, though this applies more strongly to federal candidates than state-level ones. - Rising political polarization creates a greater incentive for such an action. For instance, recent news reports highlight an unprecedented partisan campaign against incumbent state Supreme Court justices in Pennsylvania, signaling an erosion of judicial norms. - A plausible path to a successful removal would likely target a state-level office, like Governor, rather than a federal one. It would probably involve a clear violation of a state-specific rule, such as residency, which is then enforced by a partisan state authority late in the election cycle to minimize the window for a successful appeal. |
| Will the U.S. House maps for the following years give any major party an efficiency-gap advantage of ≥20 seats nationwide? (2025-2026) | 23.3% | - I predict an outside chance (23%) that the nationwide efficiency-gap advantage will reach 20 seats. The current advantage for the Republican party is 10.77 seats, as of August 2025. - Republican-led redistricting efforts in states such as Texas, Ohio, and Florida could add a net 8 to 13 seats to their advantage, according to analyst estimates in news articles. - Democratic counter-efforts could reduce this advantage. A California proposal, contingent on a November 2025 voter referendum, aims to create five new Democratic-leaning seats. - Reaching the 20-seat threshold would likely require Republican redistricting efforts to be largely successful while California's offsetting measure fails. - Such a large national seat advantage is not unprecedented. The 2012 U.S. House elections resulted in an estimated 33-seat Republican advantage. |
| Will the U.S. House maps for the following years give any major party an efficiency-gap advantage of ≥20 seats nationwide? (2027-2028) | 27.5% | - I predict an outside chance (28%) of the nationwide efficiency-gap advantage reaching or exceeding 20 seats for either party. - The current advantage is 10.8 seats for the Republican Party, according to the Michigan State University Partisan Advantage Tracker. An additional 9.2 seats of net partisan advantage is required to meet the threshold. - The primary path to reaching 20 seats is through Republican-led mid-decade redistricting. News reports indicate enacted or advancing plans could yield five new Republican seats in Texas, two to three in Ohio, and one in Missouri. - Democratic counter-efforts and historical precedent make a 20-seat gap less likely. A California ballot initiative may create five new Democratic seats, partially offsetting Republican gains. The nationwide efficiency gap after the 2010 redistricting was about 15.5 seats, below the threshold. |
| Will the losing major-party candidate in the following U.S. presidential elections refuse to concede defeat before electors meet? (2027-2028) | 29.6% | - I predict a significant risk (30%) that the losing major-party candidate in the 2028 U.S. election will refuse to concede. - The historical norm of concession has been broken. Donald Trump’s 2020 refusal to concede, followed by his 2024 re-election, overrides the low historical base rate of non-concession (~5% since 1860). - The risk of non-concession is asymmetric and comes primarily from the Republican candidate. Reporting from 2025 indicates challenging election results is a normalized political strategy, likely to be adopted by a losing Republican nominee. - Legal disincentives for challenging election results appear to be weakening. In September 2025, a Michigan judge dismissed criminal charges against individuals who acted as 'fake electors' in 2020. - This 30% forecast is anchored near the Metaculus community prediction of 28%, reflecting a consensus that the political environment has fundamentally changed. |
| Will two or more losing major-party candidates for governor or U.S. Senator in competitive races refuse to concede defeat in the following general elections? (2025-2026) | 18.1% | - I predict it is unlikely (18%) that two or more losing candidates in competitive statewide races will refuse to concede in the 2025-2026 elections. - Historical data from recent election cycles (2016-2024) show a low base rate of one non-concession per two-year period in these types of races. - There will be approximately 15 to 20 competitive gubernatorial and Senate races across 2025 and 2026, creating about 15 to 20 opportunities for a losing candidate to refuse concession. - Concession rates are paradoxically highest in the most competitive races. A Bright Line Watch report on the 2022 elections found a 96% concession rate for candidates who lost by a 0-5% margin. - The 18% risk accounts for the possibility of multiple candidates aligned with election-denial rhetoric winning primaries in key swing states like Arizona or Wisconsin and then losing their respective close races. |
| Will two or more losing major-party candidates for governor or U.S. Senator in competitive races refuse to concede defeat in the following general elections? (2027-2028) | 10.3% | - I predict an outside chance (10%) that two or more losing major-party candidates in competitive statewide races will refuse to concede in the 2027-2028 elections. - Historical precedent from 2012 to 2024 shows no election cycle with two or more non-concessions in competitive gubernatorial or U.S. Senate races. The highest number in a single cycle was one. - Data from the Bright Line Watch project shows concession rates are highest in the most competitive races. In 2022, 96% of losing candidates in races decided by a margin of 5% or less conceded. - While the norm of conceding weakened at the presidential level in 2020, it has remained resilient in down-ballot races. The rate of candidates explicitly refusing to concede across all races declined from 11% in 2020 to 4% in 2022. |
| Will a U.S. state legislative or congressional map be used for the following general elections with a total population deviation between districts of ≥12%? (2027-2028) | 1.5% | - I predict a very low likelihood (5%) that a U.S. state will use a legislative or congressional map with a total population deviation of 12% or more in the 2027-2028 elections. - For congressional districts, the Supreme Court requires near-perfect population equality, making a 12% deviation legally untenable. - For state legislative districts, population deviations above 10% are presumptively unconstitutional and require a strong, specific justification to survive court challenges. - The last known use of a map with a deviation over 12% was in Wyoming in the early 1980s, which the Supreme Court allowed as a narrow and exceptional case. - While there is a current trend of aggressive mid-decade redistricting, these efforts focus on partisan advantage, not on creating unequal district populations, which would invite swift and likely successful legal challenges. |
| Will a U.S. state legislative or congressional map be used for the following general elections with a total population deviation between districts of ≥12%? (2025-2026) | 2.0% | - I predict a low probability (5%) that a U.S. electoral map with a population deviation of 12% or more will be used in the 2025-2026 elections. - Supreme Court precedent makes such a map presumptively unconstitutional. Congressional maps require near-perfect population equality, and state legislative maps with a deviation over 10% face strict legal scrutiny. - The historical precedent is strong. No state has used a map with a deviation this high since a narrow exception for a Wyoming state legislative map in the early 1980s. - The 5% risk is driven by contentious mid-decade redistricting efforts in states like Texas, Florida, and Indiana. These partisan redraws have spurred lawsuits alleging malapportionment, creating legal and political volatility. - The most plausible, though unlikely, path to a 'Yes' resolution would be a court ordering a temporary, interim map during a chaotic legal battle, which inadvertently contains a high deviation based on the officially referenced population data. |
| Will a U.S. federal or state court prevent certification of any statewide election result in the following years because of foreign interference? (2025-2026) | 1.5% | - I predict a very low likelihood (5%) of a U.S. court preventing a statewide election certification in 2025-2026 due to foreign interference. - There is no historical precedent for a U.S. court voiding or blocking a statewide election certification on the basis of foreign interference. The legal and evidentiary threshold for such a judicial intervention is exceptionally high. - The risk is elevated above the historical baseline due to documented, ongoing influence campaigns from actors like Russia, China, and Iran, and a highly litigious political climate surrounding U.S. elections. - The most plausible path to a 'Yes' outcome involves a court issuing a temporary injunction in a close statewide race, citing credible evidence of a specific foreign cyber intrusion affecting election systems. |
| Will a U.S. federal or state court prevent certification of any statewide election result in the following years because of foreign interference? (2027-2028) | 2.6% | - I predict a low probability (5%) that a U.S. court will prevent a statewide election certification due to foreign interference during 2027-2028. - There is no historical precedent for a U.S. court issuing such an order. Legal challenges to past elections based on claims of widespread irregularities have been systematically rejected by courts due to a lack of credible evidence. - The risk is elevated above the historical baseline due to the increasing sophistication of foreign interference operations, including the use of generative AI, and a more politicized U.S. election security environment. - A |
| In the following U.S. presidential elections, will any state fail to submit a slate of electoral votes to Congress by the safe harbor deadline? (2027-2028) | 3.3% | - I predict a 5% chance that a U.S. state will fail to submit its electoral votes by the safe harbor deadline in the 2028 election. - The Electoral Count Reform Act of 2022 reduces the likelihood of this event. The law clarifies the governor's certification authority and provides for an expedited judicial review process to resolve disputes quickly. - This type of failure is historically rare. The only clear instance was Hawaii in 1960. All states successfully submitted their votes on time during the contentious 2000 and 2020 presidential elections. - A plausible pathway to failure involves an extremely close election margin in a key battleground state. This could trigger extensive litigation or a political stalemate that delays certification past the deadline. - The risk is elevated above the historical baseline due to high political polarization. Early polling suggests a potentially close 2028 presidential election, which could fuel post-election disputes. |
| Will a U.S. federal or state court prevent certification of any statewide election result in the following years because of fraud? (2025-2026) | 2.8% | - I predict a low probability (5%) that a U.S. court will block a statewide election certification due to fraud in 2025-2026. - Such an order is historically unprecedented. Despite numerous legal challenges to election results, no U.S. federal or state court has ever blocked or voided a statewide election certification because of fraud. - The wave of litigation after the 2020 election provides a strong precedent. Over 60 lawsuits alleging fraud were filed by Donald Trump and his allies, but all failed to produce a qualifying court order. - The primary pathway for a - Yes |
| Will a U.S. federal or state court prevent certification of any statewide election result in the following years because of fraud? (2027-2028) | 3.6% | - I predict a small but notable chance (5%) that a U.S. court will block a statewide election certification due to fraud during 2027-2028. - There is no historical precedent for a U.S. court blocking a statewide election certification on the basis of fraud. Over 60 lawsuits alleging fraud after the 2020 presidential election all failed to achieve this outcome. - A court order must explicitly cite fraud and remain in effect for at least two weeks to meet the resolution criteria. Appellate courts often stay or overturn extraordinary election-related orders within days, making the two-week duration a high hurdle. - I place some weight on an elevated risk environment for the 2028 elections. This is driven by high political polarization and organized efforts to challenge election administration and certification at local and state levels. - A plausible, though unlikely, scenario involves a state-level judge in a closely contested race issuing a temporary order to halt certification. Even if appealed, such an order could meet the two-week duration requirement before being vacated. |
Numerical Questions
| Question | Prediction | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| How will Bright Line Watch experts rate US democracy on a 0-100 scale at the end of the following years? (2028) | MLV: 47.5, Median: 47.5, IQR: 42.0-53.0 | - My central estimate for the Bright Line Watch expert rating of US democracy at the end of 2028 is 47. There is significant uncertainty, with a 50% confidence interval from 42 to 53 and an 80% confidence interval from 34 to 60. - The Bright Line Watch rating was stable in the 60-70 point range from 2017 to 2024 before declining to 53 in the April 2025 survey. - My forecast is heavily influenced by Bright Line Watch experts' own projections. In early 2025 surveys, they forecasted the rating would decline to 47-48 by 2027. - The wide uncertainty in my forecast reflects that the survey will occur after the November 2028 presidential election. A smooth election could lead to a rating in the 50s, whereas a contested election or constitutional crisis could push the rating into the 30s. |
| How will Bright Line Watch experts rate US democracy on a 0-100 scale at the end of the following years? (2027) | MLV: 48.5, Median: 48.0, IQR: 42.5-54.0 | - My median forecast for the Bright Line Watch expert rating of US democracy at the end of 2027 is 48 out of 100, with a 50% confidence interval of 42 to 54. - The Bright Line Watch rating fell sharply from its historical 60-70 range to 53 in April 2025, following the start of the second Trump presidency. - This decline is attributed to executive actions perceived by experts as undermining democratic norms, including pressuring the judiciary, using federal power to target opponents, and deploying the National Guard in US cities. - My forecast aligns with the 47-48 projection for 2027 made by the Bright Line Watch experts themselves, suggesting an expectation of continued institutional stress. - The main uncertainty stems from the effectiveness of institutional checks and balances, such as the judiciary and the 2026 midterm elections, in constraining executive actions. |
| How will Bright Line Watch experts rate US democracy on a 0-100 scale at the end of the following years? (2026) | MLV: 50.0, Median: 50.0, IQR: 46.5-53.5 | - I estimate the Bright Line Watch expert rating for US democracy will be 49.6 at the end of 2026, with a 50% confidence interval of 46.1 to 53.2. - This forecast reflects a continuation of the sharp decline observed in early 2025. The rating fell from a stable range of 60-70 (2017-2024) to 53 in the April 2025 survey. - The decline is driven by expert perceptions of democratic erosion. Sources from 2025 report administration actions that challenge constitutional norms, including disregarding court orders, politicizing federal agencies, and pressuring media and academic institutions. - This projection is consistent with external indicators. In early 2025, Bright Line Watch experts projected the rating would fall to the high 40s by 2027, and the U.S. Democracy Threat Index forecasts a rating of 49.6 for 2026. - Significant uncertainty remains, particularly around the November 2026 midterm elections. The outcome could either reinforce institutional checks, potentially stabilizing the rating, or weaken them, leading to a more severe decline. |
| How will Bright Line Watch experts rate US democracy on a 0-100 scale at the end of the following years? (2025) | MLV: 50.0, Median: 50.0, IQR: 47.0-53.5 | - I estimate the Bright Line Watch expert rating for US democracy will be 50 at the end of 2025, with a 50% confidence interval from 47 to 53. - The most recent rating was 53 in April 2025, a steep drop from the 60-70 range that held from 2017 to early 2025. - The forecast for a continued decline is driven by executive actions since April. These include challenging judicial authority, deploying troops domestically, and using executive orders to control federally-funded cultural institutions. - An increase in political violence, such as the assassination of an activist in September 2025, further erodes expert confidence in the stability of US democracy. - The prediction does not fall further because institutional checks from the judiciary and state governments still provide some resistance to executive overreach. |